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Continue Patching or Start Rewriting?
EDWARD J. DAMICH*
This article is loosely based on a presentation that I gave in Febru-
ary 2013 at a symposium sponsored by the University of Miami Law
Review.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Copyright Act of 19761 was a marvelous achievement. It clari-
fied, redesigned, and updated copyright law and brought it into the era of
the photocopier, the tape recorder, and cable TV. Over twenty years in
the making, the Copyright Act's singular misfortune was the timing of
its completion, which came on the threshold of the digital world, neces-
sitating rather continuous patching to cope with evolving technology.
Shortly after the Copyright Act's enactment, the first major "patch"
added the definition of "computer program" and § 117 to allow purchas-
* Senior Judge, United States Court of Federal Claims. Chief Intellectual Property Counsel,
Senate Judiciary Committee, 1995-1998. Copyright Edward J. Damich 2013.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541-98 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
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ers of computer programs to actually use them.2 (No, I am not kidding.)
The Commission on New Technological Uses ("CONTU") had recom-
mended such a provision because it reasoned that the purchaser, in load-
ing his or her program, was making an unauthorized copy.' The need to
enact § 117 was the first hint that the law's continued focus on the act of
copying would cause problems in the digital age.
The appearance of digital audio tape recorders prompted the second
major patch to the Copyright Act: the Audio Home Recording Act of
1992.4 Although this technology became obsolete almost from the
moment of its enactment, this Act is noteworthy because: (1) for the first
time, the Copyright Act required a technological protection measure to
prevent the proliferation of copies, and (2) the beneficiaries of the statu-
tory license created by the Act included performers.'
The third major patch was the Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act of 1995 ("DPRSR").6 The advent of streaming and
downloading of music from the Internet created new problems for copy-
right law, and it also provided an opportunity to expand the scope of the
public performance right for sound recordings. As a result, Congress
enacted the DPRSR, which is characterized by daunting complexity and
almost impenetrable language.
To cope with the phenomenon of the Internet more comprehen-
sively, Congress passed the fourth major patch to the Copyright Act: the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").' By 1995, the potential
of the Internet had become increasingly more realized. Enacted in the
context of ratification of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Per-
formances and Phonograms Treaty,8 the DMCA is noteworthy because:
(1) it effectively limited the secondary liability of Internet service pro-
2. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2012) (giving "the owner of a copy of a computer program" the right to
make "another copy or adaptation of that computer program . . . as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine . . . .").
3. "The new copyright law should be amended . . . to ensure that rightful possessors of
copies of computer programs may use or adapt these copies for their use." U.S NAT'L COMM'N ON
NEw TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 1 (1978). "The 1976 Act,
without change, makes it clear that the placement of any copyrighted work into a computer is the
preparation of a copy and, therefore, a potential infringement of copyright." Id. at 12.
4. Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010
(2012)).
5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1006.
6. Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(6),
114(d)-(j) (2012)).
7. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.). See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT AcT oF
1998: U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY (1998), available at http://www.copyright.gov/legisla
tion/dmca.pdf.
8. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 7, at 2.
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viders ("ISPs") in their core services;' (2) it prohibited the circumven-
tion of "technological measure[s] that . . . control[ ] access to"
copyrighted works;"o and (3) it outlawed the providing of means to cir-
cumvent technological protection measures that controlled access and
the exercise of copyright rights."
The fifth major patch failed. The Stop Online Piracy Act
("SOPA")12 and the Protect IP Act ("PIPA")13 were primarily designed
to create a mechanism to shut down rogue foreign websites, but they
also would have extended secondary liability to Internet pay systems.14
Just the mere number of these patches suggests that a major over-
haul of the Copyright Act is due. Indeed, Register of Copyrights Maria
Pallante, in a speech at Columbia University" and in testimony before
Congress,' 6 has added her comprehensive examination and in-depth
analysis to the call for reform.
My goal here is a lot more modest. I would like to provoke discus-
sion on the need for revision of the Copyright Act by highlighting issues
raised by some recent cases involving digital technology and by identi-
fying some lingering problems with our copyright system: namely fair
use, orphan works, and the status of the Copyright Office.
One major issue that emerges from these cases is the anachronism
of a copy-focused protection of authors' rights. Such a focus, coupled in
some cases with a narrow interpretation of statutory language divorced
from the larger, practical context of the cases, has produced results that I
believe have perverted the purposes of the Copyright Act.
Apart from recent cases, I believe that it is possible to identify fair
use, orphan works, and the status of the Copyright Office as lingering
problems. Fair use is unpredictable in almost any context and it is partic-
ularly difficult to accommodate in the digital world." The difficulty of
9. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (2012). The core services are "(a) transitory digital network
communications" (e.g., email); "(b) system caching"; "(c) information residing on systems or
networks at direction of users" (e.g., website hosting); and "(d) information location tools" (e.g.,
hyperlinks). Id.
10. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2012).
11. § 1201(a)(2), (b).
12. H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
13. S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).
14. Jared Newman, SOPA and PIPA: Just the Facts, PCWORLD (Jan. 17, 2012, 6:00 PM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/248298/sopa-and-pipa-just-the-facts.html.
15. See generally Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
315 (2013).
16. The Register's Call for Updates to U.S. Copyright Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 6-8
(2013) (statement of Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights of the United States).
17. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) ("The doctrine of fair use has been called, with some justification, 'the most
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determining the term and owner of a copyrighted work has increased
after U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention in 1989." Finally,
although the Copyright Office is clearly functioning as an executive
agency, it is still part of the legislative branch.19
The rest of the article is an elaboration on these themes. I welcome
debate on whether these are problems, what the solutions would be, and
whether they should be addressed legislatively.
II. DOES THE "CLOUD" HAVE A SILVER LINING?
The advent of remote storage demonstrates the difficulties caused
by copy-focused protection. The Cablevision case is illustrative.20
Digital Video Recorders ("DVRs") are becoming a staple of Amer-
ican homes.2 ' Cablevision offered to its cable TV customers a DVR in
the cloud, calling it a "Remote Storage" DVR.22 Using their cable boxes,
customers could order copies of TV programs and movies to be saved on
Cablevision's server for playback at a future time.2 3 To provide this ser-
vice, Cablevision had to momentarily record all of the programming that
it received for further transmission and route the movies and TV pro-
grams that customers had designated for recording to. more permanent
storage on Cablevision's hard drives.2 4
The copyright owners of the programs that were saved-whether
momentarily or for longer periods of time-sued Cablevision for direct
copyright infringement. 25 That is, the lawsuit focused on Cablevision's
troublesome in the whole law of copyright.'" (quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d
661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939))).
18. Although the Copyright Act of 1976 provided for a basic term of the life of the author
plus fifty years, a term of at least that length-and based on the life of the author-became
mandatory with U.S. ratification of the Berne Convention in 1989. Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). Article Seven of the Berne Convention requires that "the term of
protection ... shall be the life of the author and fifty years after his death." Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, amended Sept. 28,
1979, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 (entered into force July 10, 1974). See Carol A. Motyka,
Effects of U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 195, 195
(1990).
19. The Copyright Office is part of the Library of Congress and is funded through the
appropriation for the Library, See, e.g., U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGREsS, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
FiscAL 2014 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 89 (2013), available at http://www.loc.gov/about/reports/
budget/fy2014.pdf.
20. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
21. See Bill Carter & Brian Stelter, DVR and Streaming Prompt a Shift in the Top-Rated TV
Shows, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 5, 2012, at B 1 (reporting that, as of 2012, forty-three percent of
American households with televisions also have DVRs).
22. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 124.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 124-25.
25. Id. at 124.
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acts rather than Cablevision's facilitation of others' infringement of the
plaintiffs' rights. The copyright owners also sued Cablevision for direct
infringement of public performance rights when customers watched their
saved programs.26 Cablevision waived any defense based on fair use.2 7
The case worked its way up to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, which held that Cablevision did not infringe the
right to copy when it momentarily copied the programs it received 2 8
and-astonishingly-that Cablevision also did not infringe the plain-
tiffs' rights when it saved copies of the programs on its servers at the
request of its customers for playback at a future time. 29 The Second
Circuit also held that Cablevision had not infringed the public perform-
ance rights of the copyright owners.30
A. Momentary Copying
In holding that Cablevision's momentary copying was not an
infringement, the court based its reasoning on the definition of "copies"
and "fixation." The court found that infringement of the author's right
"to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies" requires the making of
copies as defined in the Copyright Act.' According to that definition,
copies must be fixed such that the work embodied in the copies can "be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated."32 A copy of a work
is "'fixed' . . . when its embodiment [in a copy] is sufficiently perma-
nent or stable to permit it to be [perceived,] reproduced[, [or otherwise
communicated] for a period of more than transitory duration."" The
court concluded that the 0.1 to 1.2 seconds that the data stream contain-
ing the copyrighted material lasted in Cablevision's buffers were not
more than a transitory duration; therefore, Cablevision was not making
any copies when it momentarily reproduced the copyrighted material in
the data stream.34 This conclusion is contrary to the Copyright Office's
view-expressed in its 2001 Report on the DMCA-that reproduction
for a time sufficient for further reproduction or for perception or further
communication is embodiment for more than transitory duration.35 It
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 130.
29. Id. at 133.
30. Id. at 139.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012).
32. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 127.
33. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis and omission in original)).
34. Id. at 124, 129-30.
35. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 111-12 (2001) available at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec- 104-report-vol-i .pdf. But see Cablevision, 536
F.3d at 129 (determining that the Copyright Office's definition of "fixed" "deserves only
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would seem that the Copyright Office's view leads to the conclusion
that, because the momentary reproduction of the data stream was suffi-
cient for further reproduction and communication (to Cablevision's hard
drives), Cablevision was making an unauthorized copy of the work.
B. Storage
The movies and TV programs resident on Cablevision's hard drives
for playback at a customer's command would seem to be infringing cop-
ies. There is no issue of transitory duration here. But the Second Circuit
held otherwise, basing its decision on an inquiry as to who made the
copies.36 The court decided that volitional conduct was necessary for a
copy to be made (despite the fact that copyright infringement does not
require intent) and found that the customer, not Cablevision, made the
copy." The court derived the volitional conduct element from the
Netcom case and, by analogy, to establishments that provide photocopy
machines." The district court had explored the photocopy machine anal-
ogy and had noted that Cablevision was supplying the material as well
as the means of copying." The Second Circuit admitted that Cablevi-
sion's conduct was "more proximate to the creation of illegal copying
than . . . opening a copy shop" but not "sufficiently proximate to the
copying to displace the customer as the person who 'makes' the copies
when determining liability under the Copyright Act."4 0
C. Public Performance
Everyone in the Cablevision case agreed that Cablevision transmit-
ted (and therefore performed) a movie or TV program when it responded
to a customer's command to play back the movie or TV program stored
in the customer's space on Cablevision's hard drive.4 1 The issue was
whether or not Cablevision performed "publicly."4 2 The relevant lan-
guage of the definition of "publicly" is performance "to the public ...
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the perfor-
mance . . . receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the
Skidmore deference, deference based on its 'power to persuade"' and rejecting that definition as
unpersuasive (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
36. Cablevision, 535 F.3d at 131-32.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm'n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361
(N.D. Cal. 1995)).
39. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 620
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536
F.3d 121, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2008).
40. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 132.




same time or at different times."4 3 The court concluded that there was no
public performance when Cablevision transmitted the movie or TV pro-
gram because Cablevision was transmitting "a single unique" perfor-
mance of the customer's copy of the work to the customer." In other
words, Cablevision was not transmitting a performance of the same copy
to many customers, regardless of whether the transmission occurred in
the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different
times.4 5 Unfortunately, this close reading of the definition of "publicly"
later opened the door to abuse.46
D. Copyright Without the Copies
The Second Circuit's decision regarding momentary copying and
public performance was based on parsing the language of the Copyright
Act. Its decision regarding storage was based on a concept not found in
the Copyright Act: namely, volitional conduct. It is hard to find fault
with the Second Circuit's close interpretation of the text of the Copy-
right Act regarding momentary copying and public performance,"
except to say that reasonable minds could differ as, for example, the
Copyright Office in the case of momentary copying. 48 Extending the
theory of volitional conduct to storage is far more controversial and the
proximity test seems to be very subjective. But, stepping out from the
weeds, it appears that the most effective criticism of the Second Cir-
cuit's decision is its failure to contextualize the issues presented to it.
Cablevision had constructed a system to make money out of copy-
ing and transmitting copyrighted material to its customers. 9 This was
the sole purpose of buffer copying and storage copying on its hard
drives. 0 It is difficult to conceive that Congress did not intend to
embrace this kind of activity within the concept of infringement. The
43. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
44. Id. at 139.
45. See id.
46. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the Second Circuit decision in WNET, Thirteen v.
Aereo, Inc. 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 82
U.S.L.W. 3403 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014) (No. 13-461).
47. See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 127-30, 134-37.
48. Compare U.S. COPYRIGHT OFmcE, supra note 35, at 111 ("[W]e believe that Congress
intended the copyright owner's exclusive right to extend to all reproductions from which
economic value can be derived.. . . The dividing line, then, can be drawn between reproductions
that exist for a sufficient period of time to be capable of being 'perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated' and those that do not." (internal citation omitted)) with Cablevision, 536
F.3d at 129-30 (rejecting the Copyright Office's interpretation and determining that the data
copied for up to 1.2 seconds did not meet the statutory definition of "period of more than
transitory duration" (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101)).
49. See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 124.
50. Id. at 124-25.
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Second Circuit's analogies do not seem apt: Cablevision is not like an
ISP that hosts websites with material about which it has little knowledge
and over which it exercises only distant control. It is also not providing a
copy service that anyone may use to copy material chosen by the cus-
tomer. Cablevision supplies the material. True, the Second Circuit left
the door open to secondary liability, but in light of Sony, there may not
be much behind that door.5 '
In addition to the Second Circuit's failure to contextualize the
issues, Cablevision raises a fundamental question about modem copy-
right law: its dependence on copying. There are at least two unhappy
results of this dependence. First, because the Internet runs on copying,
the focus on copying creates too much potential liability. Second, it
encourages microscopic examination of the alleged act of copying and
of the text of the statute to the detriment of the Copyright Act's purpose
and the context of the case.
What the alternative would be is beyond the stated scope of this
article (and perhaps beyond the ken of its author), but a statute that
focuses on commercial uses of copyrighted material comes immediately
to mind. Perhaps it is time to consider jettisoning our copy-based
approach to infringement. So, the cloud has a silver lining for Cablevi-
sion and for the consumer, and perhaps for those who can imagine copy-
right law without copies.
III. DIGITAL FIRST SALE
Another case that illustrates how copyright law's fixation on copy-
ing causes problems is Capitol Records v. ReDigi.52 "ReDigi market[ed]
itself as 'the world's first and only online marketplace for digital used
music.'""' ReDigi's service worked as follows: First, users download
Media Manager ("MM") software.54 MM then accesses the music files
on the user's computer and determines which ones are eligible for
uploading onto ReDigi; files downloaded legally from iTunes or from
ReDigi are eligible, while music acquired from other sources, such as
from a CD or a file-sharing system, is not eligible.5 Only eligible files
may be uploaded to ReDigi's "Cloud Locker," its remote storage server
51. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984). Sony laid the
groundwork for the development of secondary liability in copyright law. But in Sony, the Court
held that the manufacturer of a video tape recorder was not secondarily liable for its customers'
taping television programs. Id.
52. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).





in Arizona.16 MM then deletes the copies of the music file on the user's
computer, so that the only copy resides in the cloud." From the cloud,
the user can stream the music file to a device for personal use or he or
she can sell it to another ReDigi user." If another ReDigi user buys the
file, access to the file in the cloud is denied to the seller. 9 The buyer
now will have access to the cloud copy for streaming, further sale, or
download to his or her computer. 60 By means of this system, the basic
paradigm of the First Sale Doctrine is replicated because the transferor
does not have a copy and the transferee does.'
Aside from the problem of whether MM can perfectly detect eligi-
ble files and delete all of the files on the user's computer, the ines-
capable problem of ReDigi's system is that by uploading a file from the
user's computer to the cloud, a copy is made.62 A copy is also made
when the buyer downloads a file from the cloud. 3 In short, the injection
of copying into the system technically removes the process from the
First Sale Doctrine because that doctrine is an exception to the right to
publicly distribute, not the right to copy."' Indeed, the court held ReDigi
liable for making infringing copies. 5 In a copyright regime in which
infringement is not focused on the act of copying, a perfected version of
ReDigi's system would seem to fulfill the policy behind the First Sale
Doctrine.
IV. PUBLIC PERFORMANCES ON THE INTERNET
Recall that, in my judgment, the Second Circuit's close reading of
what makes a performance public under the facts in Cablevision opened
the door to mischief by ignoring the context of Cablevision's business
model.6 6 Cablevision, in the facts relevant to this discussion, received
transmissions of movies and TV programs, stored them at the behest of
its subscribers on its own hard drives, and transmitted the stored movies
56. Id.




61. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012).
62. Capitol Records, LLC, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 649 ("ReDigi's service by necessity creates a
new material object when a digital music file is either uploaded to or downloaded from the Cloud
Locker.").
63. Id.
64. See id. at 655 ("[It should be noted that the [first sale] defense is, by its own terms,
limited to assertions of the distribution right."). Note: Although the opinion reads "fair use"
instead of "first sale," the context clearly indicates that the court meant the latter.
65. Id. at 652.
66. See supra Part II.D.
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and programs to the subscribers' devices on command.6 7 Aside from the
parsing of the definition of "publicly," this money-making activity could
be fairly characterized as retransmitting the copyrighted material-on
delay. The closest analogy-and one accepted by the Southern District
of New York-is to video on demand.6 8
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc.6 9 illustrates how a company, wish-
ing to make money off the use of copyrighted material, could use the
Second Circuit's crabbed interpretation of public performance in
Cablevision to defeat the purpose of the Copyright Act.
Aereo had nearly eighty antennas about the size of a dime, con-
tained on several large antenna boards in one location.7 0 When a sub-
scriber wanted to watch or record a TV program, Aereo assigned to that
subscriber an antenna, received the transmission of the program, copied
it to a hard drive in the subscriber's reserved directory, and then trans-
mitted the copied program to the subscriber immediately or at a later
time." It is important to note that Aereo always made a copy of the
requested program, so the viewer watched the program with a slight time
lag, even if he or she wanted to watch it immediately.72
On a motion for a preliminary injunction, the Southern District of
New York determined that the plaintiffs lacked likelihood of success on
the merits because the facts were materially indistinguishable from
Cablevision." On appeal, the Second Circuit focused on infringement of
the right of public performance-specifically, the claim that Aereo was
acting like a cable TV company in the nearly simultaneous transmission
of the program when the subscriber wished to watch the program
"immediately." 74 It is significant to note that Cablevision, by contrast,
was a legitimate cable TV company that retransmitted programs to its
subscribers and provided the services of a remote DVR.11
Seduced once again by the Cablevision principle that each Aereo
subscriber was receiving a transmission of a private copy, the Second
Circuit-not surprisingly-held that Aereo was not publicly performing
67. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir.
2008).
68. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 602, 619
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
69. 712 F.3d 676, 694-95 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 82
U.S.L.W. 3403 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014) (No. 13-461).
70. Id. at 682.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 682-83.
73. Id. at 680.
74. Id. at 690-92.




the copyrighted programs. 7 6 Thus, through the artificial stratagem of
assigning an antenna and making a momentary individualized copy,
Aereo escaped copyright infringement liability. The copying issue was
not presented on appeal.
Unlike Cablevision, however, there was a dissent, which was
authored by Judge Chin. Judge Chin began his dissenting opinion by
contextualizing the issue-a practice that the Second Circuit seems to
avoid consistently. Pronouncing Aereo's technology a "sham," he
noted what seems to be an indisputable fact:
[T]here is no technologically sound reason to use a multitude of tiny
individual antennas rather than one central antenna; indeed, the sys-
tem is a Rube Goldberg-like contrivance, over-engineered in an
attempt to avoid the reach of the Copyright Act and to take advantage
of a perceived loophole in the law.7
Judge Chin backed up this characterization by analyzing the language of
the Copyright Act and the relevant legislative history.7 9 He also distin-
guished this case from Cablevision.so I commend a reading of this dis-
sent. But for the purposes of this article, it is sufficient to remark that
Judge Chin's dissent is a model of attention to text and legislative his-
tory and to the reality of Aereo's business model. Aereo's approach to
copyright protection resembles the approach in peer-to-peer copyright
infringement cases, where the software was successively "refined" to
eliminate knowledge of infringing activity (and thus escape contributory
infringement liability) to the point where, as in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the software developers boasted about
infringing without liability."
V. BURYING THEIR HEADS IN THE SAND
How far can ISPs go in ignoring copyright infringements on their
systems? This was the basic question presented to the Second Circuit on
appeal in Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.8 2 In establishing
the safe harbor for hosting websites, the DMCA looked to the usual
indicia of secondary liability: knowledge, material contribution, control,
and financial benefit." Viacom concerned the (lack of) knowledge
76. WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 696.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 697.
79. See id. at 697-701.
80. Id. at 702-03.
81. 545 U.S. 913, 919, 937-40 (2005).
82. 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012) (providing limitations on liability relating to material
online); see also Viacom Int'l, Inc., 676 F.3d at 26-28 (reviewing the DMCA safe harbor
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requirement.84 Specifically, in order to remain in the safe harbor created
by the DMCA, the ISP must not be "aware of facts or circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent."" This provision is often
referred to as the "Red Flag" provision. 6 In other words, in addition to
actual knowledge of infringing material on a website, the ISP cannot
ignore a red flag that indicates infringing activity. Put another way, if an
ISP stumbles upon infringing activity, it cannot ignore it.
A. The Plaintiffs' Allegations
We are all familiar with YouTube. If we have not uploaded a video
to YouTube, we certainly have watched videos on YouTube. What kind
of knowledge does YouTube have of the videos subscribers have
uploaded to its web space? Viacom alleged the following:
YouTube employees conducted website surveys and estimated that
75-80% of all streams contained copyrighted material. . . . Credit
Suisse, acting as financial advisor to Google [YouTube's parent com-
pany], estimated that more than 60% of YouTube content was pre-
mium copyrighted content-and that only 10% of the premium
content was authorized....
. . . YouTube attempted to search for specific Premier League
videos in order to gauge their "value based on video usage." . . .
. . . YouTube founder Jawed Karim prepared a report in March
2006 which stated that ... episodes and clips of ... [various] well-
known shows can be found [on YouTube] . . . ."
Viacom also pointed out various internal emails that indicated that high-
level YouTube employees knew about infringing content on the website
and did not remove it.88
B. The Court's Holding
Astonishingly, in the face of these allegations, the Southern District
of New York granted summary judgment to YouTube.89 The district
court held that "knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements"90
was necessary in order for YouTube to be "aware of facts or circum-
provisions); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-63 (9th Cir. 1996)
(discussing traditional indicia of secondary vicarious liability).
84. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 676 F.3d at 30.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
86. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 676 F.3d at 31.
87. Id. at 33.
88. Id. at 33-34.
89. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
90. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
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stances from which infringing activity is apparent."91 The Second Cir-
cuit agreed with the holding regarding the Red Flag provision, but it
remanded because it determined that Viacom's allegations had at least
raised issues of material fact from which a jury could conclude that You-
Tube saw red flags.9 2
The courts were perhaps influenced by the 2007 Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC.9 ' In that
case, defendants provided web hosting and other services to websites. 94
The plaintiff argued that defendants had received notice of apparent
infringement from circumstances that raised red flags: websites were
named "illegal.net" and "stolencelebritypics.com," and others involved
password hacking.95 The court held that these were not red flags.96 In the
case of the use of "illegal.net" and "stolencelebritypics.com," the court
said that these could be just come-ons; in the case of the passwords, the
court said that the ISP should not have to investigate whether the pass-
words really were hacked."
C. Commentary
Having participated in the negotiations that led up to § 512, I can
attest that the Red Flag provision was the most contentious. Perhaps the
meaning of the Red Flag provision is best understood as a midpoint of a
spectrum between actual knowledge on the far left and monitoring on
the far right. The plaintiffs in Viacom sought to equate awareness of
apparent infringing activity with generalized knowledge of infringing
activity." But generalized knowledge of infringing activity seems to lie
to the right of the midpoint of the spectrum; therefore, this kind of
knowledge cannot be placed on the points of the spectrum that are
important for determining safe harbor status. Having said this, however,
at a bench trial where the facts alleged by Viacom were proven, I would
have no qualm in ruling that YouTube saw many red flags and therefore
was not entitled to the storage safe harbor regarding the infringing mate-
rial on which the red flags were planted.
That the DMCA does not require an ISP to monitor its service or
require it to affirmatively seek facts indicating infringing activity in
order to be in a safe harbor is not inconsistent with such a ruling. First,
91. Id. at 517 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(A)(ii) (2012)).
92. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 676 F.3d at 41.
93. 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007).
94. Id. at 1108.
95. Id. at 1114.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30-31 (2d Cir. 2012).
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becoming aware of apparent infringing activity in the ordinary course of
its business is not a duty to monitor. Second, as § 512(m) suggests, an
ISP may not be required to search its system to find infringing activity in
cooperation with a copyright owner, except in the case of standard tech-
nical measures. 99 Furthermore, reacting to a red flag seems the prudent
thing to do. An ISP may remain in the safe harbor merely by taking
down the material or activity to which it is alerted by the red flag, and
§ 512(g)(1) exculpates an ISP for such removal when done in good
faith.10
In the end, I would argue that the copyright owners did not get what
they ostensibly wanted in Viacom, but they did get what they really
wanted. They did not get "generalized knowledge" as a red flag, but they
did get a remand to determine whether the knowledge alleged would be
a red flag under the court's criteria.'o In addition, the copyright owners
got a bonus: willful blindness. The court held that "the willful blindness
doctrine may be applied, in appropriate circumstances, to demonstrate
knowledge or awareness of specific instances of infringement under the
DMCA."1 2 To illustrate willful blindness, the court stated: "A person is
'willfully blind' or engages in 'conscious avoidance' amounting to
knowledge where the person was aware of a high probability of the fact
in dispute and consciously avoided confirming that fact."10 3 Presumably,
not taking down "illegal.net" and "stolencelebritypics.com," if an ISP
became aware of such websites, such would qualify as willful blindness.
Doubtless, there will be more litigation on the knowledge require-
ment of the safe harbors, but the Viacom case is a warning that ISPs and
websites cannot bury their heads in the sand.
The Viacom case may be better appreciated in the context of a trend
of cooperation between websites that host user-generated content and
copyright owners. Some copyright owners and service providers have
recently set up a formal system by which uploaders are first warned
about using copyright-infringing content and then suffer consequences
99. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1) (2012) (stating that inclusion in a safe harbor does not require "a
service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity,
except to the extent consistent with a standard technical measure").
100. Id. § 512(g)(1) ("[A] service provider shall not be liable to any person for any claim based
on the service provider's good faith disabling of access to, or removal of, material or activity
claimed to be infringing or based on facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent, regardless of whether the material or activity is ultimately determined to be
infringing.").
101. Viacom Int'l Inc., 676 F.3d at 36.
102. Id. at 35.
103. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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when these warnings are ignored." YouTube and Google have also
used special software to detect infringing material.10 5 For their part,
copyright owners have abandoned their relentless campaign of attack on
users, which has resulted in public relations (and jurisprudential) disas-
ters like the Lenz case. 106 This trend fits in nicely with the principle of
the "responsible service provider," which was agreed to by all the stake-
holders during the negotiations that led to the DMCA. Such cooperation
may lessen the need for Congress to clarify the Red Flag provision.
VI. SOPA AND PIPA: DEAD ON ARRIVAL
What further proof do we need of the clout of Internet-based com-
panies other than the sudden death of the Stop Online Piracy Act
("SOPA")o' and the Protect IP Act ("PIPA")?'0o After widespread
online protests in January 2012, action on the bills abruptly stopped, and
many sponsors jumped ship.' (And you thought the copyright owners
were powerful!) My purpose here is not to attack or defend the bills but
rather to highlight some of the problems that the bills addressed.
In general, the bills targeted rogue foreign websites ("RFWs") that
host massive amounts of infringing material.110 How can copyright own-
ers identify and stop these sites? There should be some sympathy for the
copyright owners' plight. But how to tackle this problem? The approach
of SOPA and PIPA was to fasten onto the domain name; that is, to de-
link the domain name and the Internet protocol address, so that a person
104. See The Copyright Alert System, CENTER FOR COPYRIGHT INFORMATION, http://www.copy
rightinformation.org/the-copyright-alert-system/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
105. See Content ID, YouTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited Oct. 27,
2013). Google, YouTube's parent company, receives millions of copyright removal requests on a
monthly basis. Transparency Report, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreportremov
als/copyright/ (last updated Nov. 13, 2013). Google claims that it takes an average of six hours for
it to respond to such requests. FAQs, Transparency Report, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
transparencyreport/removals/copyright/faq/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
106. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Universal, acting
for the artist Prince, sent a takedown notice to YouTube about a short video uploaded by
Stephanie Lenz because the video of Lenz's small children dancing included the song "Let's Go
Crazy" playing in the background. Id. at 1151-52. Lenz, with the assistance of various groups, got
YouTube to repost the video and sued Universal for sending a bad-faith notice because Universal
did not consider that the video could be a fair use of the song. Id. at 1152. The court denied
Universal's motion to dismiss, effectively holding that failure to consider fair use before sending a
takedown notice is relevant in determining whether the notice was filed in bad faith. See id. at
1153, 1156-57.
107. H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
108. S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).
109. E.g., Anthony Avallone, SOPA and PIPA Reaction - The Day the Web Went Black,
KEYLIMETIE BLOG (Jan. 20, 2012, 12:28 PM), http://www.keylimetie.com/blog/2012/l/20/sopa-
and-pipa-reaction-the-day-the-web-went-black/.
110. Jared Newman, SOPA and PIPA: Just the Facts, PCWORLD (Jan. 17, 2012, 6:00 PM),
http://www.pcworld.comarticle/248298/sopa-and-pipa-just-the-facts.html.
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using the name of the site would not be able to reach it (although the site
could still be reached by the IP number)."'
What intrigued me about the bills, however, was the imposition of a
duty on financial transaction providers not to service RFWs, websites
linking to the RFWs, and Internet advertising services.1 12 I was intrigued
because copyright owners have sought to make payment systems servic-
ing infringing websites secondarily liable for infringement.'1 3 The focus
on linking also reminded me of the safe harbor that the DMCA created
for information location tools. "4
For the sake of brevity, I would like to concentrate on the second-
ary liability of financial transactions providers because this issue was the
focus of a recent case and because, in that case, there were good argu-
ments on both sides of the issue. In Perfect 10 v. Visa, Perfect 10, which
"operate[d] the subscription website . .. which 'feature[d] tasteful copy-
righted images of the world's most beautiful natural models,"' sued
Visa for providing payment services to websites that infringed Perfect
10's copyrights."' Perfect 10 alleged that it repeatedly notified Visa that
holders of Visa credit cards were using their cards to purchase images
that infringed on Perfect 10's rights, and that Visa did nothing after
notice." 6 Because Visa itself was not reproducing Perfect 10's copy-
righted images, Perfect 10 had to rely on secondary liability; however,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to hold Visa secondarily
liable." 7
The court looked at the elements of contributory infringement and
vicarious liability. According to the court, the elements of contributory
infringement are knowledge, on the one hand, and material contribution
or inducement on the other."' The court skipped over the knowledge
element because it determined that Perfect 10 failed to sufficiently plead
that Visa induced or materially contributed to the infringement.' The
court held that Visa did not have a direct connection to the infringement
activity-to "reproduction, alteration, display and distribution." 20 Now,
whether a connection is direct or not is often subjective. The majority,
however, tried to make this judgment more objective by contrasting
111. E.g., Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 102(c)(2)(A)(i) (2011).
112. See id. § 103(b).
113. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n (Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n), 494 F.3d 788
(9th Cir. 2007).
114. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2012).
115. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 792-93.
116. Id. at 793.
117. Id. at 806-10.
118. Id. at 795.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 796.
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search engines (which a previous case had held to be liable for material
contribution)121 with what Visa was doing: "Google may materially con-
tribute to infringement by making it fast and easy for third parties to
locate and distribute infringing material, whereas Defendants make it
easier for infringement to be profitable, which tends to increase financial
incentives to infringe, which in turn tends to increase infringement."1 22
The court summarized its characterization of what Visa was doing as an
"additional step in the causal chain." 123
The inimitable (now Chief) Judge Kozinski, however, had none of
this. In his spirited dissent, he rejected the length of the causal chain test:
"Materiality turns on how significantly the activity helps infringement,
not on whether it's characterized as one step or two steps removed from
it." 124 Even if distance from the infringement were relevant, Judge
Kozinski noted the following: "Defendants participate in every credit
card sale of pirated images; the images are delivered to the buyer only
after defendants approve the transaction and process the payment. This
is not just an economic incentive for infringement; it's an essential step
in the infringement process."125
Turning to vicarious liability, the court skipped over the element of
direct financial interest because it found that Visa had no "right and
ability to control the infringing activity." 26 The majority emphasized
that "to control" means to directly control the actual infringing activ-
ity.127 For Judge Kozinski, however, the test was the one adopted by the
Supreme Court in Grokster: "One . .. infringes vicariously by profiting
from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or
limit it."' 2 8 Clearly, Kozinski's Grokster test is much broader than the
majority's test, especially because the Grokster test would include limit-
ing the infringement as well as stopping it.
The key case for the majority, however, was Perfect 10 v.
Amazon.com,129 which was decided after the Supreme Court's Grokster
decision. Amazon.com concerned the operation of Google's search
121. See Perfect 10, Inc. v Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon.com), 487 F.3d 701, 729 (9th Cir.
2007) ("Google could be held contributorily liable if it had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10
images were available using its search engine, could take simple measures to prevent further
damage to Perfect 10's copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps.").
122. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 797.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 812 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 811-12.
126. Id. at 803 (majority opinion).
127. See id. at 804-05. The majority somewhat confuses the test by using "supervision" as
well as "control." Id. at 805.
128. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005); see also
Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n., 494 F.3d at 816 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
129. 487 F.3d 701 (Amazon.com) (9th Cir. 2007).
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engine, which, in response to an image inquiry, returned thumbnail
reproductions of infringing images. 1 30 When a user clicked on the
thumbnail to see the full-size image, the image appeared because Google
connected the user to the website on which the image was stored, not
because Amazon reproduced the full-size image.131 The Ninth Circuit
held that, consequently, Google was not liable for direct infringement,
but it also held that Google was not vicariously liable.'3 2 According to
the majority opinion in Visa, "the [Amazon.com] court found that
Google's ability to control its own index, search results, and webpages
does not give Google the right to control the infringing acts of third
parties even though that ability would allow Google to affect those
infringing acts to some degree.""' For the Visa majority, there is no
conflict between Amazon.com and Grokster because the focus of the
inquiry for both cases was not the degree of control (e.g., stop or limit)
but the effect of the control on the infringing activity. 134 The test is
whether the defendant "exercise[s] sufficient control over the actual
infringing activity for vicarious liability to attach." 3
Kozinski, however, accuses the majority of requiring an "'absolute
right to stop [the infringing activity]' as a predicate for vicarious liabil-
ity."" 6 He reads Amazon.com as requiring only the "practical ability" to
do so.1 37 Therefore, he concludes that "[w]hile proclaiming its fidelity to
Amazon, . . . the majority jettisons Amazon's 'practical ability' standard
and substitutes its own 'absolute right to stop' standard." 3 1
The reasoning of the majority and the reasoning of the dissent seem
to fly by each other rather than to meet each other head on. In any event,
the reasoning of the majority is another example of the inability (or
unwillingness) of courts to contextualize the dispute-or at least admit
to doing so. In this case, the majority was not parsing the statute but was
avoiding the effect of precedent-primarily, the holding and rationale of
Amazon.com.'3 9 (Unlike the Patent Act, secondary liability is not codi-
130. Id. at 711.
131. Id. at 711-12.
132. Id. at 716-18, 730-31.
133. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n., 494 F.3d at 803 (majority opinion) (citing Amazon.com, 487 F.3d
at 730-32).
134. Id. at 803-05.
135. Id. at 806.
136. Id. at 818 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
137. Id. (citing Amazon.com, 487 F.3d at 731).
138. Id. (citing Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 804 (majority opinion)).
139. 487 F.3d 701, 730 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that while "Google could be held
contributorily liable if it had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 were available using its search
engines, could take simple measures to prevent further damage . . ., and failed to take such steps,"
that, on the issue of vicarious liability, "Perfect 10 has not demonstrated a likelihood of showing
that Google has the legal right to stop or limit the direct infringement of third party websites."
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fied in the Copyright Act.)140 Yet, because of the indeterminacy of the
"direct connection" test for contributory infringement and the narrow
focus on control over the "actual infringing activity," one gets the
impression that the real motivation for the decision was simply the feel-
ing that credit card companies were too removed from the infringement
and that taking steps to avoid liability would be too much of a burden
for them. Therefore-more precisely-the Visa majority surreptitiously
contextualized the dispute while it ostensibly engaged in pure legal rea-
soning. Judge Kozinski, by contrast, forthrightly focused on the fact that
credit card companies were knowingly making money off of infringe-
ment and that they could quite easily pull their financial plugs.' 4 '
In any event, after Visa, it is no wonder that copyright owners
might want to begin to conscript credit card companies into their anti-
piracy war by statute rather than by reliance on the courts. Furthermore,
SOPA, PIPA, and Visa suggest that secondary liability be included in a
revised Copyright Act. To preserve flexibility, perhaps it should be
treated like fair use: listing of general principles, augmented with spe-
cific imposition of secondary liability for the activities, such as provid-
ing financial transactions, knowingly linking to infringing websites, and
providing Internet advertising services.
VII. THE UNPREDICTABLES: FAIR USE AND THE EXPIRATION
OF THE COPYRIGHT TERM
When Congress codified the judicially created doctrine of fair use
as § 107 of the Copyright Act, it chose to enact guidelines that allow for
greater flexibility."' 2 This choice may be contrasted with that of other
regimes, such as those found in some European countries, where fair
uses are spelled out with some specificity. 143 The obverse of the coin of
flexibility, however, is unpredictability, and the cost of unpredictability
lies heavily on those with good faith but without monetary resources.
(citing Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)). "The
dissent disagrees with our reading of Amazon.com and charges us with wishful thinking . . . and
with 'draw[ing] a series of ephemeral distinctions . . . .' Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 797
(citing id. at 811, 825 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)). See also id. at 795 ("To find that Defendants'
activities fall within the scope of such tests [as Amazon.com] would require a radical and
inappropriate expansion of existing principles of secondary liability and would violate the public
policy of the United States.").
140. See 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(c) (2006).
141. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 810-11 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("If such active
participation in infringing conduct does not amount to individual infringement, it's hard to
imagine what would.").
142. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S.
417, 447 n.29 (1984).
143. See, e.g., Intellectual Property Code, art. L122-5 (Fr.), available at http://www.wipo.int/
wipolex/en/text.jsp?file id= 180336.
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The Lenz case mentioned above, where a mom bested a rock star, but
only with outside help, dramatically illustrates this point (although bad
law was created as a result).'"4
In addition to this inherent problem with the doctrine of fair use,
there are practical problems that arise when attempting to accommodate
fair use in the digital environment. For example, once a copy is made for
fair use of a work, how can that copy be limited to the fair use? This
dilemma perplexed those involved in drafting the anti-circumvention
provisions of § 1201.145 To recast the question posed in this context: if
one is permitted to circumvent a technical protection measure ("TPM")
in order to make a fair use copy of a work, how will that copy be limited
to the fair use?
In addition to the putative fair user, unpredictability also dogs the
person who in good faith wants to comply with the Copyright Act, but
who cannot determine whether a work is still under copyright or who
owns the copyright. The Copyright Office identified and closely follows
this issue, which is known as the "orphan works" problem.'4 6 While it
has been the subject of legislative proposals, 147 now is the time to act on
this problem.
A. Fair Use Advisory Opinion
I believe an administrative (or perhaps quasi-judicial) procedure
would alleviate the unpredictability of a determination of fair use and at
the same time respect the flexibility of § 107. As part of this procedure,
a user would apply for an advisory opinion from the Copyright Office as
to whether a particular use would be fair. If the Copyright Office advises
in the affirmative, then armed with this opinion, the user would be
exempt from monetary liability but could still be subject to an injunc-
tion. This process could be entirely housed in an online system. David
Post has adumbrated such a system in his article on virtual magis-
trates.14 ' It deserves to be examined carefully.
144. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008); see also supra
note 106.
145. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(E) (2012). The statute provides a mechanism whereby the
Librarian of Congress, "upon the recommendation of the Register of Copyrights," through a
rulemaking procedure, determines which class of works are exempt for a succeeding three-year
period from the prohibition of circumventing technical protection measures that control access to a
copyrighted work in order to make non-infringing uses of such classes of works. Id.
§ 1201(a)(1)(A), (C).
146. See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (2006), http://www
.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf.
147. See generally The "Orphan Works" Problem and Proposed Legislation: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
I10th Cong. (2008) (statement of Marybeth Peters, the Register of Copyrights).
148. David G. Post, Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Engineering a Virtual Magistrate
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B. Fair Use and Anti-Circumvention
How to accommodate fair use in anti-circumvention legislation
was-and is-a thorny problem. The solution embodied in § 1201(a)(1)
(B)-(E) was to allow the Librarian of Congress (effectively the Copy-
right Office) to provide three-year exemptions to certain classes of
works from the prohibition of § 1201(a)(1)(A) against the act of circum-
venting a TPM to gain access to a copyrighted work.149 The criteria that
guide the Librarian's determination are set out in § 1201(a)(1)(C).so
Aside from its recent decision not to renew the exemption for unlocking
of cell phones, the Library of Congress-granted exemptions have been
fairly non-controversial. 51 However, this decision prompted a flurry of
bills to reverse it.15 2
It is noteworthy that, according to the language of the statute, the
exemptions apply only to the act of circumventing to achieve access;
providing the means by which access is achieved is prohibited under
certain circumstances by § 1201(a)(2).15 3 Thus, presumably, only the
technologically adept at circumvention can escape liability. This conclu-
sion would make the exemptions practically useless for the normal user,
unless it is possible to make the circumventing-means provider an agent
(of the user) who is specifically engaged to do the job so that the pro-
vider can take advantage of the user's exempt status.
It is also worth noting that nothing in the statute prohibits the act of
circumventing copy controls, although providing the means to do so
would violate § 1201(b) under certain circumstances. 154 So again, a user
who has access to a TPM-protected work and who is confident that mak-
ing a copy of the work would constitute a fair use would have to circum-
vent the protection himself. One can imagine a scenario in which the
person who circumvents a copy-control TPM and makes a copy is pro-
tected by fair use, while the provider of the software that enables cir-
cumvention is liable under the statute.
Although in principle I would like to see these anomalies
System (Cyberspace Law Inst., Working Paper No. 2, 1996), available at http://www.temple.edu/
lawschool/dpost/Vmaj.htm).
149. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A)-(E).
150. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
151. See, e.g., Andrew Couts, Awesome New Bill Legalizes Cell Phone Unlocking, 'Fixes' the
DMCA, DIGITAL TRENDS (May 9, 2013), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/new-bill-legalizes-
cell-phone-unlocking-fixes-the-dmca/.
152. See id.
153. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) ("No person shall circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.") with id.
§ 1201(a)(1)(D) ("[T]he prohibition in subparagraph (A) shall not apply" to works determined by
the Librarian to be exempted.).
154. See id. § 1201(b).
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addressed, I must admit that once a TPM is circumvented to make a fair
use of the work, the work will then be available for unfair uses as well.
To put it another way, it would be nice if circumvention could be con-
fined to fair uses of the protected work.
Let me end with another cautionary note: Getting rid of anti-cir-
cumvention law is not an option. The United States is obligated by vir-
tue of Article 11 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty to "provide adequate
legal protection and effective legal remedies against . . . circumven-
tion."' The European Union has issued a Directive that calls for prohi-
bition of not only the acts of circumvention, but also providing the
means to circumvent under various circumstances. 1 56 Thus, the real
issue is how anti-circumvention law can be modified, if at all, so as to
better accommodate the fair use of copyrighted works.
VIII. THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE: A LIVING FossIL
The great Barbara Ringer, former Register of Copyrights, once told
me that most people believed the Copyright Office was two little old
ladies and a file cabinet. I doubt that this view holds true today, but I
still think most people would be surprised to find that the Copyright
Office is a part of the Library of Congress.'5 7 Looking again at § 1201,
isn't it odd that the Librarian of Congress decides on exemptions to the
prohibition of circumvention to gain access to a protected work? The
Copyright Office engages in rulemaking when it decides on exemp-
tions.15' Additionally, Copyright Royalty Judges in the Copyright Office
adjudicate the fees that cable and satellite television companies pay and
distribute these fee-produced funds to the owners of the copyrights used
by the fee payers.'15 Although the Register advises Congress on domes-
tic and foreign copyright issues,160 the Director of the United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") has the title of Under Secretary of
Commerce for Intellectual Property,i'' which includes copyright. More-
over, in practice, the USPTO takes the lead on international copyright
affairs with the Copyright Office's assistance.16 2
By statute, the Register is appointed by the Librarian of Congress
155. WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. I1, Apr. 12, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1996).
156. Council Directive 2001/29, art. 6, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 17 (EC).
157. See U.S. LinRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 19, at 2.
158. 17 U.S.C § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2012) (requiring the Librarian of Congress to use a rulemaking
procedure to determine exemptions).
159. Id. § 801(b).
160. Id. § 701(b)(1).
161. See USPTO Leadership, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/about/bios (last visited Jan. 16,
2014).
162. See 17 U.S.C. § 701 (2)-(3).
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and acts "under the Librarian's general direction and supervision." 6
The Librarian is not just a rubber stamp; the current Librarian, Dr. James
H. Billington-still at his post at the age of 84-has acted against the
recommendation of the Register with regard to the anti-circumvention
exemptions."6
From a functional perspective, the Copyright Office is similar to an
executive agency. Therefore, it is not surprising that the activities of the
Register have been challenged as violating the principle of separation of
legislative from executive powers. 16 5 In Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the Copyright Office did
not violate the Separation of Powers clause, reasoning that although the
Copyright Office was an executive agency because it functioned like
one, it was under the supervision of the Librarian of Congress, who is
appointed by the President.166 However, despite the Fourth Circuit's
holding, Mr. Gass points to other cases that undermine that court's
reasoning.16 7
Regardless of where one falls on the constitutional-unconstitutional
spectrum, there seems to be agreement that the Copyright Office at least
functions as an executive agency, given its rulemaking and adjudicatory
powers.168 This fact, coupled with copyright law's importance to the
U.S. economy and the digital world,16 9 suggests policymakers should
seriously consider taking the Copyright Office out of the legislative
branch and formalizing its position in the executive branch. For that
matter, the importance of intellectual property in general would be better
served by an Intellectual Property Office that is a separate agency in the
executive branch, uniting the administration and promotion of all three
branches of intellectual property. There is no constitutional objection
163. Id. § 701(a).
164. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access
Control Technologies, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,825, 43,838 (July 27, 2010) ("The Librarian has
considered but rejected the Register's recommendation with respect to the proposed class of works
consisting of literary works distributed in ebook format.").
165. See Andy Gass, Considering Copyright Rulemaking: The Constitutional Question, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1047, 1050-51 (2012).
166. 579 F.2d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 1978) ("[Iln reviewing the several functions of the Librarian
of Congress, it would appear indisputable that the operations of the Office of Copyright are
executive. . . . The operations of the Office of the Register are administrative and the Register
must accordingly owe his appointment, as he does, to appointment by one who is in turn
appointed by the President in accordance with the Appointments Clause [viz., the Librarian of
Congress].").
167. See Gass, supra note 165, at 1059-61 (citing United States v. Brooks, 945 F. Supp. 830,
833 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("The status of the Copyright Office is an open question in the Third Circuit
and I do not find Eltra persuasive.")).
168. See 17 U.S.C. §§801(b), 1201(a)(1)(C) (2012).
169. S. 1961, 104th Cong. (2d Sess. 1996), 142 CONG. REc. 17,199 (1996) (statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch).
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against the USPTO being in the Department of Commerce, and U.S.
intellectual property policy would be better off.
Such a proposal was briefly batted around while I was Chief Intel-
lectual Property Counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee, largely
because of the interest of then-chairman, Senator Orrin Hatch.170 The
proposal never developed momentum, however. My impression was that
the copyright owners liked "two-stop shopping"; that is, the possibility
of getting what they wanted from one agency if they didn't get it from
the other. Also at play was the natural tendency for the Librarian of
Congress to protect his own turf. Finally, some critics felt that the artis-
tic and cultural aspects of copyright would be given short shrift in an
agency otherwise dominated by patent concerns. '7 And so the anomaly
continues and arguably worsens, as the U.S. Trade Representative
claims part of the intellectual property "action,"1 72 and the Obama
Administration sees the need for an intellectual property enforcement
czar.
At a minimum, the scattered bailiwicks of intellectual property
should be identified and evaluated to see if bringing them together and
out from under other constituencies would be advantageous.
IX. SUMMARY
The Copyright Act does indeed need revision. Whether such a revi-
sion would entail a complete overhaul or just a major rewrite is another
question. A complete overhaul would require a fundamental shift from a
focus on copying. A mere revision might clarify the definition of "cop-
ies" and "publicly." Other revisions might specify instances of second-
ary liability, make fair-use determinations more predictable, and deal
with the orphan works problem. Perhaps there is also an alternate solu-
tion that would better accommodate fair use in the context of anti-cir-
cumvention. A major change, reorganizing the ways in which
intellectual property policy is made (both domestically and internation-
ally) and the patent, copyright, and trademark systems are administered
is doable, but only if "good government" can triumph (as it sometimes
does) over entrenched interests. I commend Register Pallante for begin-
ning the discussion, and I hope that this article in a modest way has
promoted it.
170. Id. at 17,199-200.
171. Telephone Interview with Jane Ginsburg, Professor, Columbia University School of Law
(1996 or 1997).
172. See generally DEMETRIOS MARAffflS, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2013
SPECIAL 301 REPORT (2013), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/05012013%20
2013%2OSpecial%20301%20Report.pdf.
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